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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Brent N. Tortolano appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of his 
successive petitions for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In relation to Tortolano's previous petition for post-conviction relief, the Court of 
Appeals offered the following factual background: 
Following a jury trial, Tortolano was convicted of second degree 
murder, Idaho Code §§ 18-4001, 18-4002, 18-4003, and sentenced to 
thirty years incarceration, with twenty years fixed. Tortolano, through 
counsel, filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. He alleged that his 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate Tortolano's mental 
health history, failing to ensure Tortolano received his prescribed 
medications before and during trial, and failing to advise Tortolano of all 
aspects of plea agreements offered by the State and assist Tortolano in 
weighing the benefits of a plea agreement against the risk of going to trial. 
Tortolano argued that but for these alleged deficiencies, he would 
have pied guilty and received a lesser sentence. Tortolano also argued 
that he was not able to assist in his defense at trial because his counsel 
did not ensure he was receiving his prescribed medications. After an 
evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the post-conviction petition, 
holding that Tortolano had not established that his trial counsel had acted 
deficiently or that he had suffered any prejudice. Tortolano now appeals, 
pro se, the district court's denial, relying on the same arguments that his 
counsel made below. 
Tortolano v. State, Docket No. 35987, 2010 Unpublished Op. No. 563, pp.1-2 (Idaho 
App., July 26, 2010). Determining that Tortolano failed to show that his trial counsel's 
performance was deficient, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of 
Tortolano's post-conviction petition. kl at 4. 
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On June 28, 2012, Tortolano filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief, 
again asserting that his trial counsel had been ineffective and that his original post-
conviction counsel had also been ineffective. (41552 R., pp.5-12.) Tortolano requested 
and was granted counsel. (Id., pp.27-29, 32.) The state filed a motion to dismiss the 
successive petition on the grounds that it was untimely, that Tortolano had failed to 
show a sufficient reason to file a successive petition, and that the petition failed to raise 
a material issue of fact upon which relief could be granted. (Id., pp.54-55, 77-93.) 
Following a hearing on the state's motion (See Tr.,1 pp.4-19), the district court granted 
the motion and dismissed Tortolano's successive petition (41552 R., pp.109-10, 120). 
Tortolano filed a timely notice of appeal. (Id., pp.111-14.) 
While his successive petition for post-conviction relief was still pending, Tortolano 
also filed another successive post-conviction petition, prose. (41551 R., pp.3-7.) The 
state filed a motion to dismiss this second successive post-conviction petition (Id., 
pp.25-26), which the district court also granted (Id., pp.34-35, 45). Tortolano filed a 
timely notice of appeal. (Id., pp.36-39.) 
1 While there are two transcripts included in the appellate record, each is identical to 
the other with the exception of the assigned docket number. (See Trs., p.2.) 
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ISSUE 
T ortolano's statement of the issues presented on appeal is found at page 8 of his 
Appellant's brief and is lengthy. The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Tortolano failed to show error in the district court's summary dismissal of his 
successive petitions for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
Tortolano Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Summary Dismissal Of His 
Untimely Successive Petitions For Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
Tortolano was originally convicted of second degree murder in 2003. (41552 R., 
p.6.) He appealed and his conviction was affirmed with remittitur entering August 17, 
2006. (Id.) In 2007, Tortolano filed his first petition for post-conviction relief, which was 
denied following an evidentiary hearing. (Id., p.7.) In June 2012, Tortolano filed his first 
successive petition for post-conviction relief. (Id., pp.5-11.) Tortolano requested and 
was granted appointed counsel. (Id., pp.27-29, 32.) While that first successive petition 
was pending, Tortolano filed, pro se, a second successive petition for post-conviction 
relief. (41551 R., pp.3-6.) The state filed motions to dismiss each petition (41551 R., 
pp.25-26; 41552 R., pp.54-55, 77-93) which the district court granted (41551 R., pp.34-
35; 41552 R., pp.109-10). 
On appeal, Tortolano argues that the district court erred by summarily dismissing 
his successive petitions for post-conviction relief, claiming that he presented issues of 
material fact in relation to his Brady2 violation and ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, and that the time limits should be tolled. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-27.) 
Application of the correct legal standards to the facts alleged by Tortolano, however, 
shows no error in the district court's summary dismissal of his successive post-
conviction petitions. 
2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1969). 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file 
.... " Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-
Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
C. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Each Of Tortolano's Successive Petitions 
For Post-Conviction Relief 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a 
new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of 
establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; 
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). Generally, the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply to petitions for post-conviction relief. Pizzuto v. 
State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008). However, unlike other civil 
complaints, in post-conviction cases the "application must contain much more than a 
short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 
8(a)(1)." Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002)). 
Instead, the application must be supported by a statement that "specifically set[s] forth 
the grounds upon which the application is based." kl (citing I.C. § 19-4903). "The 
application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its 
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allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 
548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008) (citing I.C. § 19-4903). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906(c) authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion. 'To withstand summary dismissal, 
a post-conviction applicant must present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to 
each element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State 
v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 
581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to 
summary dismissal "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact" 
as to each element of the petitioner's claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 
802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a 
court must accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required 
to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d 
at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)). 
"Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief when 
(1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not 
justify relief as a matter of law." lil 
Application of these foregoing standards shows that the district court correctly 
dismissed each of Tortolano's successive post-conviction petitions. 
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1. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Tortolano's First Successive 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
While most of his argument challenges the dismissal of his second successive 
petition for post-conviction relief, Tortolano also appears to challenge the district court's 
dismissal of his first successive petition. (See Appellant's brief.) The state requested 
summary dismissal on the grounds that (1) Tortolano's successive petition was 
untimely; (2) he failed to show a sufficient reason for filing a successive petition; and (3) 
the petition failed to raise a material issue of fact. Tortolano's first successive petition 
was properly dismissed on each ground. 
Under Idaho Code § 19-4902(a), to be timely, a post-conviction proceeding must 
be commenced by filing a petition "any time within one (1) year from the expiration of 
the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of 
proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later." Because Tortolano's successive 
petition was not filed within a year of the finality of judgment, it was untimely. 
Of course, in the case of successive petitions the Idaho Supreme Court has 
"recognized that rigid application of I.C. § 19-4902 would preclude courts from 
considering 'claims which simply are not known to the defendant within the time limit, 
yet raise important due process issues."' Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 
P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009) (quoting Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 
870, 874 (2007)). Idaho appellate courts have allowed equitable tolling in cases where 
the petitioner is incarcerated in an out-of-state facility without access to representation 
or Idaho legal materials, where his mental illness or medications render him 
incompetent and prevent him from pursuing a timely challenge to his conviction, or 
where the petitioner's claim is based on newly discovered evidence. Judd v. State, 148 
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Idaho 22, 25-26, 218 P.3d 1, 4-5 (Ct App. 2009). Absent a showing by the petitioner 
that the limitations period should be tolled, however, any petition filed outside the one-
year limitation period of Idaho Code § 19-4902 is time-barred and subject to summary 
dismissal. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190-91, 30 P.3d 967, 968-69 (2001 ); 
Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 385, 256 P.3d 791, 793 (Ct. App. 2011 ). 
Tortolano failed to present any reason for applying equitable tolling to his initial 
successive post-conviction petition. His initial successive petition was therefore 
properly dismissed because it was untimely. 
Additionally, Tortolano failed to show a sufficient reason for filing a successive 
post-conviction petition. Under Idaho Code § 19-4908, all claims must be raised in the 
initial post-conviction petition, and a petitioner must show a sufficient reason for filing a 
successive petition or that petition will be dismissed. Tortolano's first successive 
petition raised several claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel. (41552 R., pp.6-11.) Neither shows a sufficient 
reason for filing the successive petition. Tortolano's claims of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel were, or should have been, previously litigated; they were the subject of his 
initial petition for post-conviction relief. Tortolano, 2010 Unpublished Op. No. 563, pp.2-
4; see also Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 253, 220 P.3d at 1072 ("[w]e have repeatedly held 
that ineffective assistance of counsel claims can or should be known after trial."). Under 
the statute, "[a]ny grounds for relief not raised [in the initial petition] are permanently 
waived if the grounds were known or should have been known at the time of the first 
petition." Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 933-34, 801 P.2d 1283, 1284-85 (1990). 
Likewise, Tortolano's claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel do not 
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show a sufficient reason for filing a successive petition. Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 
389, _, 327 P.3d 365, 367 (2014). Because Tortolano failed to show a sufficient 
reason to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief, the district court correctly 
dismissed his successive petition. 
Finally, as noted by the district court, because Tortolano's first successive 
petition merely sought to relitigate the claims from his original post-conviction petition, 
he failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court, 
therefore, correctly dismissed it. 
2. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Tortolano's Second Successive 
Post-Conviction Petition 
Tortolano also claims that the district court erred by dismissing his second 
successive post-conviction petition. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-26.) The state requested 
to dismiss the second successive petition (1) because it was an inappropriate pro se 
filing (41551 R., pp.25-26); (2) for the same reasons as the first successive petition (Tr., 
p.12, Ls.17-22); and (3) because the evidence Tortolano presented in his second 
successive petition would not entitle him to any relief (Tr., p.12, L.22 - p.14, L.13). 
Dismissal was proper on each of these grounds. 
Acting prose, Tortolano filed his second successive post-conviction petition while 
his first petition was still pending and he was represented by appointed counsel. 
(Compare 41551 R., pp.3-6 with 41552 R., p.32.) There is no right to hybrid 
representation. See United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1981) ("A 
criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to both self-representation and the 
assistance of counsel."). After granting Tortolano's request for the appointment of 
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counsel, the district court was not required to consider and respond to any of 
Tortolano's subsequent pro se filings as though he were unrepresented. See United 
States v. Bergman, 813 F.2d 1027, 1009 (9th Cir. 1987) (district court did not err by 
refusing to acknowledge defendant's prose filings when he was represented). To do so 
would effectively nullify the appointment of counsel and potentially interfere with the 
attorney-client relationship. Therefore, the district court could properly reject Tortolano's 
second successive petition on the basis that he had counsel and was thus not entitled 
to bring an additional petition pro se. 
Additionally, Tortolano's second successive petition suffers from the same 
defects as the first: It is untimely and he failed to offer a sufficient reason to file a 
successive petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Tortolano contends that he is 
entitled to equitable tolling on this second successive petition because he alleged newly 
discovered evidence of a Brady violation. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-21.) Tortolano's 
"Brady violation," so called, consisted of an affidavit from a prospective state's witness, 
Fred Latham, who was not called to testify at trial, explaining that he changed his mind 
about testifying. (See 41551 R., pp.8-11.) The Court has expressed a willingness to 
extend equitable tolling to petitions for post conviction relief where the defendant 
establishes newly discovered evidence of a Brady violation. See Rhoades, 148 Idaho 
at 251,220 P.3d at 1070; Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904, 174 P.3d at 874. However, 
Tortolano's equitable tolling argument fails on its merits because he failed to present 
any evidence of a Brady violation, much less newly discovered evidence under the 
standards set forth in State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976). 
10 
The United States Supreme Court has held that "the suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 
where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment. ... " Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
The Court has defined "material" as "when prejudice to the accused ensues ... [and 
where] the nondisclosure [is] so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the 
suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict." Strickler v. Greene, 527 
U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). Tortolano's Brady claim fails because he has presented no 
evidence that the state suppressed any evidence (material or otherwise) in his 
prosecution, and the "evidence" he presented, the affidavit of Fred Latham (41551 R., 
pp.8-11), is neither exculpatory nor impeaching. Tortolano failed to present a prima 
facie claim of a Brady violation. 
Tortolano further failed to establish that his purported "evidence" qualified as 
"newly discovered." To succeed, a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence must establish (1) that the evidence was unknown to the defendant at the time 
of trial; (2) that the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) that it 
will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) that failure to learn of the evidence was due 
to no lack of diligence on the part of the defendant. Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d 
at 978; Cunningham v. State, 117 Idaho 428, 433, 788 P.2d 243, 248 (Ct. App. 1990). 
T ortolano's "newly discovered evidence" fails to meet these criteria. First, Tortolano 
was at the trial where Fred Latham did not testify, so the evidence was not "unkown to 
the defendant at the time of trial;" second, as discussed above, the "evidence" is not 
material; and, third, even if it were possible that Tortolano could fail to discover that 
11 
Fred Latham did not testify at his trial, that could only be due to a lack of diligence on 
T ortolano's part. 
As found by the district court, Tortolano's claims were immaterial. (R., p.34 ("this 
court finds that, even if true, the Petitioner has not raised an issue which would entitle 
him to relief').) Tortolano failed to show a sufficient reason to file (another) successive 
petition and the district court correctly dismissed it. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's orders 
summarily dismissing Tortolano's successive petitions for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 5th day of January, 2015. 
~~ ( •I • ~  PENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of January, 2015, served true and 
correct copies of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by placing two copies in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
BRENT N. TORTOLANO 
IDOC #68840 
ISCI 
PO Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
RJS/pm 
. a ji,I~/,-.. ~/fih 
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Deputy Attorney General 
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